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Operation AL FAJR (New Dawn) had for its objective the destruction of the terrorist element in the Iraqi city of Fallujah and the peaceful restoration of the town to its residents. Fallujah was important to the overall campaign in Iraq because it had become a significant terrorist strongpoint and had large symbolic importance because it was the single city in Iraq that seemed to resist all efforts of the Multinational Force (MNF) and the Iraqi government to cleanse it of anti-Iraqi influence. As the planning for the battle proceeded, it also gained importance as the first major battle in Iraq that was directed and controlled by the newly installed Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) of Prime Minister Iyad
Allawi. Due to its scope and degree of success, AL FAJR provides a number of important lessons to be learned for any future multinational combat operation.
As the high intensity combat in Fallujah drew to a close in mid-December, 2004, it became clear that the battle had achieved many of its tactical objectives and served to illustrate a number of key facts that would be important for the future of the MNF campaign in Iraq. Among these were the importance of information operations, the Fallujah has a very ugly history with coalition forces, and much of this history is linked to its now-famous bridges. During the first Gulf War, one errant laser guided bomb from a British jet intended to destroy the bridges over the Euphrates failed to guide, and landed in the market area killing between 50 and 150 locals. This was only the first of several ugly incidents, which later heightened distrust between residents of Fallujah and multinational forces.
After portions of the Al Anbar province were taken under the control of special operations forces during the early weeks of operation Iraqi Freedom, the first American force to really control the area around Fallujah was an Army Armored Cavalry Regiment. The irony was that the Marines had arrived with a very different and more integrated approach to their mission in mind, yet this chilling act quickly drove them into 6 a much more traditional assault on the city, which began on 5 April -within a few weeks of their arrival. As with any combat operation in urban terrain, the toll on the civilian population was nearly unavoidable and its effects had a profoundly negative effect on the international media and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) -the national authority in Iraq at the time. By 8 April, with bombs being dropped in the city, senior officials were questioning some of the tactics used in the fight. Very quickly the Iraqis near the seat of government in Baghdad urged restraint and began negations with the insurgents. Soon, the CPA, under the leadership of Paul Bremer, directed that some halt to the operation be developed in order to reduce the perceived civilian damage. At noon on 9 April, the momentum of the operation was stopped through a "temporary halt to offensive operations." By 13 April high-level negotiations had started and the operation to destroy the insurgents was effectively on hold. Unfortunately the leadership of the Fallujah Brigade was heavily influenced by the city leaders and was in fact playing both sides of the confrontation. It was also infiltrated by insurgents.
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The real test of the Fallujah Brigade began on 4 May when General Latif agreed to take over remaining Marine positions around the city and to reassert control over the city center the following day. By the following week, the MNF had already begun limited humanitarian assistance to the residents of Fallujah and had even developed a claims process for battle damage in the city. The cease-fire was holding and the MNF was planning to conduct a major convoy through the heart of the city on the 10 th of May, Fallujah for a few weeks, but the influence of the insurgency that "turned back the
Marine assault" only grew.
The next major shift in the situation in Fallujah occurred when Lieutenant Colonel
Sulimann of the Iraqi National Guard was kidnapped and killed by insurgents in the city.
He was a local national guard battalion commander and the first aggressive Iraqi officer to really stand out in his efforts to return order to Fallujah. When he was kidnapped in
August and tortured to death, the MNF leadership saw that no local success was likely in the city. From that point forward the focus of effort was to restore the peace through military means. A concurrent operation in the Shia city of Najaf that same month demonstrated for the first time that some Iraqi forces would fight against insurgents, but only if they were recruited from other areas of Iraq and only if they were closely integrated with MNF units.
Lessons from First Contact
For the MNF in general and the Marines in specific, VIGILANT RESOLVE was very instructive. The enemy was extremely smart and adaptable and would fight under all 10 conditions. In the face of such an enemy, the Iraqi leaders were as yet uncertain in their commitment to intense combat in cities. Such an enemy had to separated from its base of support in the local population. Even more importantly, the MNF realized that the public affairs fight was just as important as the tactical battle. The objectives and benefits of any future operation had to be clear to all concerned. Civil-military activities had to planned and integrated from the outset. Finally, a fully integrated command structure and capable Iraqi forces were required for any future operation.
Shaping Operations prior to the Assault
With the clear lessons of VIGILANT RESOLVE in mind the MEF realized that continued pressure on Fallujah might not be soluble by negotiations and that plans for a second military assault needed to be refined. One key different in any future attack would be the effort to split the AIF from their popular support base and a parallel reinforcing effort designed to draw the civilian population out the city in advance of the fighting. If the population voluntarily left their homes, it would benefit the MNF in three critical ways. First the incidence of civilian casualties would be reduced, and that would protect the MNF leadership from efforts to stop the assault. Second, the AIF forces would be increasingly less well hidden and sheltered by innocent civilians and precision targeting could take greater effect in the city. Finally the shaping forces had a tendency to draw out enemy forces so that they could be positively identified and attacked. On many occasions ground forces would make feints along the south and eastern sides of the city to draw out the enemy defensive forces and allow us to identify their key forces, defensive structures and C2 nodes. Finally, the shaping actions of the MNF helped deceive the enemy as to the actual point of the attack. The insurgent leadership could have no doubt that the attack would come, but the constant probing of the shaping phases helped convince them that the main attack would come again from the south and east, as had been the case in VIGILANT RESOLVE.
Isolation:
In the immediate hours prior to the start of the assault on Fallujah the MEF concentrated its efforts on isolating the city from the insurgency. This isolation was critical to prevent to escape of the insurgents in the city and to ensure that AIF forces would not be able to reinforce their forces. Using the "Blackjack Brigade" from the 1 st Cavalry Division, the Division cut and controlled all the roads leading to Fallujah, then moved a light armored task force including the Iraqi 36 th Commando battalion up the peninsula west of the city to effective seal it off. Once the city was surrounded 5 the main combat forces of the 1 st Marine Division moved into place all along the northern edge of Fallujah.
Meanwhile attack air support continued to attack know locations of enemy forces and to strike any AIF units that posed a direct threat (these included berms designed to aid the AIF attack and weapons caches, as well as crew served weapons.) Using intelligence gathering capability the MEF also attacked positively identified enemy locations when collateral damage could be minimized. The overall effect was to break up the AIF command and control structure in the city and to destroy force and positions that could threaten our forces. Most of the fighters in the northern sections of the city were quickly overrun.
Combat Operations
They were locally recruited thugs and criminals with little stomach for the horror of urban warfare; in the southern half of the city though, MNF forces found much more determined defenders, dug in in-depth with reinforcing positions. These were manned by the hard-core members of the insurgency, most of whom still lay buried in or near
Fallujah. Due to the MEF's shaping operations, the enemy expected an attack from the south and it was in that section of the city that they fought hardest. As a consequence most of Fallujah south of the main avenue was severely damaged.
Operation The initial objectives of the attack were secured early and the entire city was under MNF control after four days of very hard fighting. Although small pockets of determined, even suicidal insurgents would continue to fight for nearly a month, the MEF 14 staff began to focus on the vitally important transition to local control during the first week of combat. The city needed to be secure and made safe, essential services had to be restored to minimal levels and the residents of the city had to have some semblance of normalcy in tier lives before the promise of freedom from insurgents would have any meaning. This was the real test of AL FAJR.
The basic concept of the operation depended upon a series of transitions, from combat, to restoration of security and essential services to resettlement and return to local control by an Iraqi municipal government. Minimum requirements for conflict termination were identified prior to beginning combat operations. These included a nonlocal police force to enter the city, a civilian or military mayor to manage essential services in the city and a package of reconstruction projects designed to restore the city's infrastructure to pre-conflict levels rapidly after the terrorist influence was destroyed.
These pre-requisites were briefed all the way up the chain to the Prime Minister of Iraq.
The transition from combat operations to restoration of essential services and humanitarian assistance was envisioned to be spatial not time based. In other words while fighting was continuing in some areas of the city, where possible MNF and Iraqi forces would be rebuilding pump houses and electrical substations in an area not far away, and in other location within the city military forces would also be providing humanitarian relief supplies to the remaining Fallujah residents.
In practice, this conditions-based conflict termination process worked rather well, but it did suffer from some significant challenges. First of all, the essential agreed upon pre-requisites were never completely met. The Interim Iraqi Government of Ayad Allawi did appoint a military governor, then Major General Abdul-Qater, but his authority in the 15 city was never clearly explained. Perhaps more importantly the Minister of the Interior flatly failed in his commitment to bring in police forces from outside the city and coalition soldiers, to include two battalions of newly formed public order battalions, were used instead to provide police function in the city for several months. Finally, both the MNF and the IIG did commit funds for the city' restoration, but at least initially there was no coordinating mechanism to determine who should accomplish which essential
project and in what order projects were to be completed. It will surprise no one to know that the MNF and Iraqi priorities for restoration were different.
What became crucial to the successful resettlement of the city was the formation of several multifunctional working groups that served as control mechanisms for the return of stability in Fallujah. These were working coalition command and control (C2) processes that facilitated unity of effort at tactical and operational levels. The first of The one gap in coverage of this two meeting process was the operational level.
Like most nations, Iraq has a provincial government level. For the operation in Fallujah, the provincial government was in Ramadi and the appointed Governor there was never very well integrated into the coordination process. Initially, the civilian governor was so repressed and intimidated by insurgent threats that he played no visible role; afterwards Prime Minster Allawi appointed a new Governor Sheik Fassel al-Goud, but he only attended one meeting in Fallujah and did nothing to assist in the reconstruction effort. His provincial Directors-general could have added much to the recovery process but we effectively absent from the process.
Post-conflict Actions
Using these processes, and under significant pressure from a minority of government personnel in Baghdad the city was opened for resettlement on December 23
2004, only 6 weeks after the assault. Resettlement required careful planning to match security concerns with available resources. Residents were anxious to return to the city, for many had been living in surrounding cities or in transient camps for month, winter weather had turned cold and their children were missing school. Unfortunately, combat operations had destroyed the rail line outside the city, one of the key power transformers that provided electricity to homes and businesses and the most crucial of 10 water pump stations in the city was also destroyed, flooding large segments of the most populated neighborhoods. The Iraqi Government and the MNF were both very concerned about reinfiltration of insurgents with residents, so the MEF decided to establish 5 entry control points (ECPs) that restricted all access to Fallujah, in much the same way as airport screening is done. ECPs made for long lines on the roads leading back to Fallujah but also significantly reduced the number of insurgents who returned. Most who returned were quickly identified by other Iraqis and detained, killed by security forces at weapons caches or reintegrated and changed their approach towards the insurgency.
The return of the residents had to be conditions-based because the infrastructure was so strained that it could not support the full population. Therefore the MEF proposed and the Iraqi Government approved a district-by-district schedule for the reopening the city matched to essential services restoration. The entire resettlement schedule extended for only three weeks, but by limiting the returns to specified districts the minimal needs of the people could be met as the residents returned across the city.
Because AL FAJR was an Iraqi Government directed operation the host nation was had primary responsibility for the restoration of power, and supply of fuel, food and potable water. Fallujah was a city in significant distress and returning residents required immediate humanitarian assistance while to government began to difficult process of restoring essential services. Immediate humanitarian assistance had been planned in advance by the civil affairs group of the MEF. With the construction engineering help of the Navy SeaBees, three large parks in the city were used to store and dispense essential supplies (food, water, blankets and health items.) Maneuver battalions with Iraqi security forces support provided security in each site (lessons learned the previous year concerning food riots drove the MEF to use multiple protective measures including wire, search machines and security over watch. Luckily, and most likely due to the strong security posture, no incidents occurred at any of the distribution sites.
There was some significant political pressure to resolve the Fallujah issue quickly.
Prime Minister Allawi wanted to show the Sunnis that they would be cared for at least as 
Civil military operations. Civil military operations (CMO) include population
and resource control, humanitarian assistance and many forms of coordination with the host nation. For AL FAJR, civil affairs forces were integrated within the assault echelon of the force so that the needs to the population could be addressed immediately and throughout the battle. Even in the first days of the attack, civil affairs units were dealing with the local population to compensate them for damages, help them bury the dead, and provide them food and water. They also helped clarify the real goals of the operation for those living in Fallujah so that they could help protect themselves. As the operation progressed, the civil affairs forces turned their attention to the construction and management of sites providing humanitarian assistance.
Before the attack, civil affairs planners had helped to identify locations in the city that should have been protected from MNF fires. During the fighting they moved to assess the status and functioning of the many essential services areas (most were municipal government facilities such as water purification and sewage) so that any immediate repairs could be started. Without these actions the city would have been under water for months and largely uninhabitable. Finally, after the most severe fighting was completed and the residents were returning to the city, the major civil military effort was designed to restore the city public works, food water and fuel distribution and traffic police to prior fighting levels. The fight for Fallujah was important to the overall campaign in Iraq because it eliminated a significant terrorist strongpoint that had symbolized insurgent power in the face of an MNF attack; it had been the single city in Iraq that had stood against the MNF, and the Iraqi government had to cleanse it of its anti-Iraqi forces. It was the first major battle in Iraq directed and controlled by the sovereign Iraqi Government. Because of its success, AL FAJR marked a turning point in the campaign and set a new tone for future operations in Iraq. It not only achieved its tactical objectives but also illustrated numerous techniques that would be important for the MNF campaign in Iraq.
